Action at Salman Pak

This is the text of an email I just sent to all my own subordinate leaders:



Gentlemen,

It's not often I slap you guys with a reading assignment, but I expect all HHC officers and NCOs to read this.

The link is to an after action report of an ambush on a platoon of Kentucky Army National Guard MP's, at Salman Pak, which is a short way south and east of Baghdad.


http://www.blackfive.net/main/2005/03/after_action_re.html (scroll down a couple of paragraphs.

There are a lot of tactical and SOP lessons here which apply directly to our operations.


In a nutshell, the KY MPs kicked Muj ass. They reacted aggressively, and brought their heaviest firepower to bear on the enemy's flank and quickly gained fire superiority, and moved decisively to close with and destroy the enemy. Right out of the MTP.

But they also acted smartly: The trail element of the convoy moved far enough back that they had time to assess the situation and identify the enemy's disposition before becoming decisively engaged. The .50 gunner also recognized the enemy's small fleet of cars for what they were, engaged them, and destroyed them, cutting off the enemy's means of escape. This may have been the difference between killing half of them while the other half got away to attack us again, and annihilating the enemy.

Note also that every single one of the enemy carried handcuffs. We had heard before that the enemy wanted to take a female American soldier hostage. I would die before I let that happen within small arms range of me. Here we see evidence, though, that the enemy is trying concertedly to take one or more of our own alive.

Note also how a standard vehicle load plan SOP allowed one NCO to quickly reload ammo in her personal weapon from another crew's vehicle and get back into the fight. This happened because the NCO support channel, from the 1SG on down, *enforced* the SOP.

Ditto for the weapons. These MPs were able to fight with grenades dismounted because their leaders performed precombat checks, and made sure their LBVs were loaded with the right stuff.

This is not something officers can or should be doing: This is good-old-fashioned nuts-and-bolts good leadership right down to the E-5 buck sergeant level. Officers check to make sure your NCOs are doing their jobs, but NCOs make it happen!

Officers, please pay particular attention to the effect of a shortage of ball ammunition in the field. In war, there will always be shortages. And often you just can't get what you need. But you owe it to your troops to turn over every (ethical) rock, nag your superiors, and harangue the loggies to get what you need.

These weren't pikers. The enemy chose fairly decent ground, and initially took positions in an L shaped trench. They themselves attempted to assault through the kill zone. Maybe that was a reasonable tactical decision, maybe not...it obviously didn't pay off for them. But these insurgents were motivated, and the ambush was planned through, complete with a withdrawal plan.

All in all, a good read. And I think it demonstrates that National Guard units can be, and are the equal, of any comparable unit in the regular army.

I'm confident that you men are of the same caliber as they. Train like this.

Have a happy and safe Easter weekend. I look forward to seeing all of you again soon.

CPT Van Steenwyk