COUNTERCOLUMN: All Your Bias Are Belong to Us

Regarding the news that mortality among young black males in Philadelphia exceeds that of troops in Iraq, A reader comments:

Error on my part: the death rate of military personnel in Iraq is 2.5x the death rate of American males 18-39.

The statistic that really stands out is that the Iraq death rate is 18% of the Vietnam death rate. This makes me wonder whether the U.S. operation in Iraq is actually too cautious. Not that I want more dead, but are commanders being too risk-avoidant?

I have read elsewhere that U.S. troops in Iraq tend to use 100 bullets where one will do, to the point that a bullet shortage appeared and commanders had to tell troops to fire less often.

This is true of infantry combat since time immemorial. In combat, very few bullets actually strike human flesh. S.L.A. Marshall did a lot of writing to the effect that in a real infantry fight, only one or two men in ten are actually aiming their rifles.

This is certainly true of the insurgents, who routinely carry stockless AK-47s useless for anything but spray and pray.

But I don't think the author understands infantry combat. Modern combat, right down to the squad level, consists of fire and maneuver. The support by fire element is relatively stationary. It's goal is not to kill, so much, but to pin the enemy in place. This, theoretically, allows the assault element to maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear, from a direction from which the enemy is not covered or concealed, and from which he cannot bring effective fires to bear, because his fire is masked by his own troops. Essentially, the infantry leader is trying to pin the opposing fleet on the rocks, and then cross his "T" with the assault element. Then the assault element does the real killing. Actually, the assault element fights a battle of annihilation.

It's a small-scale enactment of Sun Tzu's ordinary and extraordinary forces. The high volume of fire comes from the support by fire element. And this volume of fire is supposed to be overwhelming. If it's not overwhelming -- if the sheer volume of fire isn't disintegrating mason walls from in front of the enemy force, causing them to shrink their heads into their shirts, dig their faces into the ground, and pray for their Islamo-mamas long enough for the assault element to shoot them in their backs as they whimper and cry, then the support element leader isn't doing his job like he should.

The shortage of ammunition is not due to the inefficiency of the soldier, but to severe procurement problems because of an antiquated industrial base.

The US Army logistical system has plenty of spare throughput for ammunition. So does the USMC. They can each support a pitched mechanized battle at the division and corps levels. Military logistics are not being taxed. But the civilian infrastructure is - thanks to decades of short-sightedness and neglect.

Hope you didn't spend the entire peace dividend.

I've also read that U.S. troops in Iraq are more likely than, say, the British troops there to call in an airstrike when under fire from a sniper somewhere.

I would hope so.

Any on the ground commander who is in contact, and has air available, and doesn't use it is guilty of deriliction of duty.

The reason U.S. troops are willing to use more firepower than UK troops is because we have the firepower available. That's a good thing. Not a point of criticism.

There was a Scottish regiment sometime back that got into an old-fashioned bayonet charge against anti-Iraqi forces.

An English regiment engaged in a bayonet charge at Goose Green in the Falkland campaign in 1982. Yes, the leader of the charge won the Victoria Cross. And yes, it was posthumous.

As far as I'm concerned, if any U.S. soldier or Marine is reduced to a bayonet fight anywhere in the world, then someone in the logistical chain has failed him.

As an infantry company XO, it was my job to ensure that no matter how many bad guys we faced, there wasn't going to be any bayonet fighting.

I don't know if any of these criticisms are accurate, and I'm sure that the chest-beaters of the U.S. military will call me a friend of the terrorists for asking the question, because tough questions are the very last thing they want to face.

Don't worry. Your questioning isn't very tough.

But if the military is being too risk-avoidant

When it's you and your friends suiting up...and when you and your commanders have to write the letters home and attend the memorial services, the risk-reward calculation looks and FEELS a lot different than when you're posting on a blog.

That's not to discount the question. A commander must know when to commit, and must understand that violent action from a position of temporary advantage and resulting in a decisive victory NOW is better than delaying and risking an indecisive or bloodier engagement later. Which is true at all levels of command, right up to the commander in chief.

(an outgrowth of Rummy's not sending as many troops as the generals wanted in the first place?)

That sentiment, quite simply, is a lie.

Only General Abizaid and General Franks had the standing to request more troops. And neither of them did. In fact, General Abizaid made a conscious decision to limit the number of troops on the ground early on even though more were available at that point. (Looking for the link. It's buried in the comments section somewhere last spring).

Update: But see here for some useful critiques of my thinking.

the consequences could be expected to be pretty similar to the ones that are now going down in Iraq, such as daily disorder and a wide gap between the local people and the U.S. forces.

Although that sentiment is not a lie. In fact, I expected a protracted guerrilla campaign all along - akin to Israel in the West Bank or the Brits in Ireland. But the commenter refers to 'the local people' as if they were one monolithic group.

They are not.

The comment belies a fundamental misunderstanding of the war.

There are large areas in Iraq where relations between Iraqis and the United States are excellent. There are other areas which are hostile. This is no surprise. And this is key: No realistic amount of US troops in 2003 would have changed that fact.