Monday, May 24, 2004
Refighting the Viet Nam War, Redux
A reader emails:
Nevertheless, my point stands: had the US remained in Viet Nam, the Khmer Rouge could not have risked staking all on their 1975 offensive, and Lon Nol would not have been as weak and made so inviting a target for such an offensive.
The US began bombing Cambodia in 1968, and had engaged in numerous cross border operations even before then. Khmer Rouge strength was estimated at 3,000 in 1970. So between 1968 and 1970, the Khmer Rouge gained only 3,000 adherants. It wasn't until the US became committed to 'Vietnamization,' began its public withdrawal in 1969 and thereby squandered its credibility in the region, that the Khmer Rouge strength exploded--which it did, 10 fold, between 1970 and 1973. In inverse relation to US strength in Viet Nam.
Correlation is not causality. But I cannot imagine a general Khmer Rouge offensive could have been feasable with their base threatened by US ground troops, the likelihood that any tactical successes against the Cambodian government would be dampened by US airpower, and any tactical failures made disastrous by the same. and the prospect that the US would not allow a communist insurgency to overthrow Lon Nol or anyone else.
And of course, the presence of powerful friends abroad makes it easier for a ruler to retain powerful friends at home. And the Khmer Rouge would have a hard time recruiting motivated guerrillas for a losing fight.
The Khmer Rouge could have made themselves a thorn in the side of the Cambodian government almost indefinitely. They could not have taken control of the country.
It is interesting--and rather damning--that years after the North Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge, the United Nations continued to recognize the Khmer Rouge as the official government of Kampuchea.
My central point, however, is that Howard Zinn has publicly written that an anticipated bloodbath after US withdrawal "did not happen."
That is an ouright lie even if you discount the Khmer Rouge, and needs to be confronted.
Splash, out
Jason
There was undoubtedly some initial support of the Khmer from the NVA, but it was the US supported overthrow of Prince Sihanouk by General Lon Nol and the destruction of much of easter Cambodia by US bombing and invasion that provided the Khmer Rouge with their root. The relationship between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese Communists was always strained by competing interpretations of what it means to be Communist and by the historical rivalry between the two peoples. Note that it was the Vietnamese who put an end to the Khmer reign of terror in 1979. Certainly our failure to support our South Vietnamese allies against the invasion in 1975 made it clear that there would be no intervention to support Lon Nol, but what little support we supplied prior to '75 had not been enough to deter an inevitable Khmer victory; the people of Cambodia hated the Lon Nol devil they knew more than they feared the demonic Khmer that did not know.
Nevertheless, my point stands: had the US remained in Viet Nam, the Khmer Rouge could not have risked staking all on their 1975 offensive, and Lon Nol would not have been as weak and made so inviting a target for such an offensive.
The US began bombing Cambodia in 1968, and had engaged in numerous cross border operations even before then. Khmer Rouge strength was estimated at 3,000 in 1970. So between 1968 and 1970, the Khmer Rouge gained only 3,000 adherants. It wasn't until the US became committed to 'Vietnamization,' began its public withdrawal in 1969 and thereby squandered its credibility in the region, that the Khmer Rouge strength exploded--which it did, 10 fold, between 1970 and 1973. In inverse relation to US strength in Viet Nam.
Correlation is not causality. But I cannot imagine a general Khmer Rouge offensive could have been feasable with their base threatened by US ground troops, the likelihood that any tactical successes against the Cambodian government would be dampened by US airpower, and any tactical failures made disastrous by the same. and the prospect that the US would not allow a communist insurgency to overthrow Lon Nol or anyone else.
And of course, the presence of powerful friends abroad makes it easier for a ruler to retain powerful friends at home. And the Khmer Rouge would have a hard time recruiting motivated guerrillas for a losing fight.
The Khmer Rouge could have made themselves a thorn in the side of the Cambodian government almost indefinitely. They could not have taken control of the country.
It is interesting--and rather damning--that years after the North Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge, the United Nations continued to recognize the Khmer Rouge as the official government of Kampuchea.
My central point, however, is that Howard Zinn has publicly written that an anticipated bloodbath after US withdrawal "did not happen."
That is an ouright lie even if you discount the Khmer Rouge, and needs to be confronted.
Splash, out
Jason
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