Friday, May 14, 2004
Phil Carter is having a bit of crisis of faith when it comes to reserve component units.
One clear lesson, especially to those who have served both on active duty and in the reserves like me, is that America may need to rethink its policy of relying on the reserves for so much of its military capacity -- especially in critical areas like MP work and Civil Affairs work. Reserve soldiers are great patriotic Americans, and their leaders are too. But quite simply, these reserve officers and NCOs don't have the professional experience, maturity or knowledge to do their jobs as leaders.
I think Phil's looking at the Army through the wrong end of the telescope here.
First of all, he's reasoning backwards: he is looking at a specific instance and then extrapolating to the general. That's a logical fallacy to begin with. That reasoning cannot explain the tens of thousands of reserve component soldiers running around Iraq who do have the experience, maturity, and knowledge to do their jobs as leaders.
Let's not blame it on lack of maturity, either. I can come up with a whole laundry list of episodes of trigger-happiness and lack of fire discipline on the part of active duty units. Some units had particular reputations for being too quick to shoot. Which is a different kind of leadership failure. And just as damaging.
The Americal Division--the unit responsible for the My Lai massacre--was an Active Duty unit.
(Conversely,) The 100th Battalion, 442nd Regimental Combat Team, the most decorated unit of its size in World War II, is a reserve unit.
There are a lot of Iraqis who didn't get shot, though--and a lot of touchy situations that didn't turn violent-- because reserve component soldiers on the scene were older and more mature than active duty troops at a given rank.
Further, what happened at Abu Ghraib was not the result of a lack of MOS proficiency. The defense attorneys will try to blame the Army for not training them, or plead ignorance because "we're just reservists."
That argument is, in every important sense, a lie.
The problem in this case was not reserve status or lack of MOS knowledge. The problem was a critical mass of sociopathic behavior, and a failure of officers not sociopathically inclined to supervise and correct these behaviors.
It could have just as easily happened had it been an active duty unit. Indeed, much of any reserve component's leadership has active duty experience themselves.
This is not a reserve vs. active story. This is a story about a few sadistic individuals and the officers and NCOs who failed to supervise them.
Their status as reservists is not relevant. Nor was their MOS knowledge.
And if Phil Carter has a problem with reserve component training, equipment, and knowledge levels, then the thing to do is improve those, rather than stop relying on reservists in time of war.
The defense budget is not infinite. We cannot keep everyone on the payroll full time in peacetime. Nor should we.
Splash, out
Jason
One clear lesson, especially to those who have served both on active duty and in the reserves like me, is that America may need to rethink its policy of relying on the reserves for so much of its military capacity -- especially in critical areas like MP work and Civil Affairs work. Reserve soldiers are great patriotic Americans, and their leaders are too. But quite simply, these reserve officers and NCOs don't have the professional experience, maturity or knowledge to do their jobs as leaders.
I think Phil's looking at the Army through the wrong end of the telescope here.
First of all, he's reasoning backwards: he is looking at a specific instance and then extrapolating to the general. That's a logical fallacy to begin with. That reasoning cannot explain the tens of thousands of reserve component soldiers running around Iraq who do have the experience, maturity, and knowledge to do their jobs as leaders.
Let's not blame it on lack of maturity, either. I can come up with a whole laundry list of episodes of trigger-happiness and lack of fire discipline on the part of active duty units. Some units had particular reputations for being too quick to shoot. Which is a different kind of leadership failure. And just as damaging.
The Americal Division--the unit responsible for the My Lai massacre--was an Active Duty unit.
(Conversely,) The 100th Battalion, 442nd Regimental Combat Team, the most decorated unit of its size in World War II, is a reserve unit.
There are a lot of Iraqis who didn't get shot, though--and a lot of touchy situations that didn't turn violent-- because reserve component soldiers on the scene were older and more mature than active duty troops at a given rank.
Further, what happened at Abu Ghraib was not the result of a lack of MOS proficiency. The defense attorneys will try to blame the Army for not training them, or plead ignorance because "we're just reservists."
That argument is, in every important sense, a lie.
The problem in this case was not reserve status or lack of MOS knowledge. The problem was a critical mass of sociopathic behavior, and a failure of officers not sociopathically inclined to supervise and correct these behaviors.
It could have just as easily happened had it been an active duty unit. Indeed, much of any reserve component's leadership has active duty experience themselves.
This is not a reserve vs. active story. This is a story about a few sadistic individuals and the officers and NCOs who failed to supervise them.
Their status as reservists is not relevant. Nor was their MOS knowledge.
And if Phil Carter has a problem with reserve component training, equipment, and knowledge levels, then the thing to do is improve those, rather than stop relying on reservists in time of war.
The defense budget is not infinite. We cannot keep everyone on the payroll full time in peacetime. Nor should we.
Splash, out
Jason
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