Monday, May 03, 2004
Letters, Lord, I Get Letters...
From a reader:
I am sort of curious, how would you resolve this statement with a definition of initiative? Do you acknowledge initiative as a military virtue?
Would you describe the commander in charge of Fallujah as responsible for setting policy in Fallujah?
Is the commander in Fallujah's higher priority conservation of force or adherence to abstract policy?
Are regulations for the guidance of military commanders or are they inflexible rules that must be adhered to at all times?
Do you really think that the Marine commander's solution won't work and save the lives of the Marines under his command while accomplishing the mission?
What has the Army been doing to rehabilitate the Iraqi Officer Corps?
Okay, some of these questions are cheap shots. But you have been there and have commanded detachments in combat, and I have not. It looks to me like the commander on the scene is using initiative in a difficult situation and is trying something new. I do not think that this would work with the Army, but I do think this is worth trying with the Marines. They certainly have made this kind of thing work in the past with their regular troops.
I'd like to know what you think, but that policy setting comment was kind of irritating. As a veteran, it strikes me as the kind of remark a paper-pushing trade school staff puke would make, and you haven't been talking like that about the Army. I don't think you are that kind of officer. Of course, you are up for promotion, and I have noticed that changes some officers.
My response: Initiative is great. When a young offier has initiative, it means he's not afraid to take positive action on his own authority in the absence of guidance or orders from higher.
But it is not great when the action--i.e., making a separate arrangement with a Ba'athist general to recruit and arm a militia of his own--is at variance with established policy rightfully made in Baghdad. And it's not great when guidance is available, but the lower echelon of command just didn't bother to communicate their intentions and coordinate their actions with the higher headquarters.
Valuing initiative is great because it maximizes the freedom of action of commanders on the ground who are most familiar with the immediate tactical situation.
But this freedom of action has to be tempered with respect for the boss's freedom of action. A junior officer must work hard to keep the boss's options open.
And when commanders begin making separate peaces with Baath party remnants and handing out brigade commands, then they are 'driving out of their lane,' as they say in the military.
I'm not saying recruiting General Saleh was a bad idea. Actually, I like the idea, in principle.
What causes me concern is the apparent lack of communication between Baghdad and Fallujah.
This lack of communication has the effect of undermining the negotiating position of the Marines and Baghdad alike. How can Bremer negotiate if a better deal can be cut with his subordinate commanders? How can the subordinate commanders negotiate if the perception is that whatever deal they strike will be countermanded by Baghdad?
It's just sloppy, careless, and clumsy.
Splash, out
Jason
I am sort of curious, how would you resolve this statement with a definition of initiative? Do you acknowledge initiative as a military virtue?
Would you describe the commander in charge of Fallujah as responsible for setting policy in Fallujah?
Is the commander in Fallujah's higher priority conservation of force or adherence to abstract policy?
Are regulations for the guidance of military commanders or are they inflexible rules that must be adhered to at all times?
Do you really think that the Marine commander's solution won't work and save the lives of the Marines under his command while accomplishing the mission?
What has the Army been doing to rehabilitate the Iraqi Officer Corps?
Okay, some of these questions are cheap shots. But you have been there and have commanded detachments in combat, and I have not. It looks to me like the commander on the scene is using initiative in a difficult situation and is trying something new. I do not think that this would work with the Army, but I do think this is worth trying with the Marines. They certainly have made this kind of thing work in the past with their regular troops.
I'd like to know what you think, but that policy setting comment was kind of irritating. As a veteran, it strikes me as the kind of remark a paper-pushing trade school staff puke would make, and you haven't been talking like that about the Army. I don't think you are that kind of officer. Of course, you are up for promotion, and I have noticed that changes some officers.
My response: Initiative is great. When a young offier has initiative, it means he's not afraid to take positive action on his own authority in the absence of guidance or orders from higher.
But it is not great when the action--i.e., making a separate arrangement with a Ba'athist general to recruit and arm a militia of his own--is at variance with established policy rightfully made in Baghdad. And it's not great when guidance is available, but the lower echelon of command just didn't bother to communicate their intentions and coordinate their actions with the higher headquarters.
Valuing initiative is great because it maximizes the freedom of action of commanders on the ground who are most familiar with the immediate tactical situation.
But this freedom of action has to be tempered with respect for the boss's freedom of action. A junior officer must work hard to keep the boss's options open.
And when commanders begin making separate peaces with Baath party remnants and handing out brigade commands, then they are 'driving out of their lane,' as they say in the military.
I'm not saying recruiting General Saleh was a bad idea. Actually, I like the idea, in principle.
What causes me concern is the apparent lack of communication between Baghdad and Fallujah.
This lack of communication has the effect of undermining the negotiating position of the Marines and Baghdad alike. How can Bremer negotiate if a better deal can be cut with his subordinate commanders? How can the subordinate commanders negotiate if the perception is that whatever deal they strike will be countermanded by Baghdad?
It's just sloppy, careless, and clumsy.
Splash, out
Jason
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