Sunday, May 09, 2004
Are We Winning the Battles But Losing the War?
MG Swannack, the 82nd Airborne Division commander, seems to think so.
A little background: General Swannack had his headquarters in Ramadi, about 30 miles west of Fallujah, from September of 2003 until just a few weeks ago. His command included one brigade of the 1rst Infantry division (which at that time included my own battalion, the 1-124th Infantry), and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. His area of responsibility went from Fallujah to Ramadi out to Hit and Al Qaim, and the western Iraq frontier all the way to Jordan.
So he is familiar with a big chunk of Iraq, and with Fallujah and Ramadi, he was also responsible for some of Iraq's toughest real estate.
But he was not directly responsible for the Kurdish areas around Mosul and points north, nor did his territory extend to the Shiite territories in the southern and eastern areas of the country.
So his assessment is going to be colored by that experience.
Swannack doesn't draw the comparison with Viet Nam, of course. But everyone else does. Panama was Viet Nam. Bosnia was Viet Nam. Haiti was Viet Nam. Afghanistan was Viet Nam. How many conflicts have to be Viet Nam before we finally figure out that the only country that is Viet Nam is a country in southeast Asia called Viet Nam?
All conflicts proceed according to their own logic, and not according to Viet Nam's.
As for the assessment that we may be losing strategically, I think we run into a definitional problem. Here's the paradox: Iraq can take turns for the worse at one level--the stiffening of resistance in Fallujah, or an uprising in the Shiite cities, for example--while the strategic situation in the middle east improves overall, even as a result of the invasion of Iraq, i.e., the decision of Muammar Khadafi to give up his WMDs and push for limited reforms in his government, or the reduced dependency of the United States on the good graces of the fickle and untrustworthy Saudi Arabian regime.
And with every passing day, we get closer to elections in the Shiite areas, which may well embolden democratic reformers in Iran and hasten change there.
All that happens quite independently of what happens in Fallujah or Abu Ghraib. But antidemocratic elements understand that dominos can fall both ways, and they can be expected to increase their murderous methods as we move closer to a democratic Shia. And the better the elections look, the more desperately the terrorists will work to sabotage them.
So one could see a situation where real progress toward democracy will spark an increase in terrorism. So a successful pro-democratic policy can look like a failure when assessed in terms of counterterrorism. In the short run, in Iraq.
And if there is no prospect of progress towards democracy in Iraq, then terrorists can focus their efforts elsewhere. Terrorism in certain areas could decline as a result. And so a policy which maximizes the reduction of terrorism in the short run could also mean it's a failure when assessed in terms of installing democracy--or even a stable and benevent non-democratic society.
So things can look worse even as they're getting better. And they can look better even as the situation subtly deteriorates. It's counterinuitive. It's Carrolian.
But such is the game theory of warfare, where one side is constantly reacting and adjusting to the actions of another.
A little background: General Swannack had his headquarters in Ramadi, about 30 miles west of Fallujah, from September of 2003 until just a few weeks ago. His command included one brigade of the 1rst Infantry division (which at that time included my own battalion, the 1-124th Infantry), and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. His area of responsibility went from Fallujah to Ramadi out to Hit and Al Qaim, and the western Iraq frontier all the way to Jordan.
So he is familiar with a big chunk of Iraq, and with Fallujah and Ramadi, he was also responsible for some of Iraq's toughest real estate.
But he was not directly responsible for the Kurdish areas around Mosul and points north, nor did his territory extend to the Shiite territories in the southern and eastern areas of the country.
So his assessment is going to be colored by that experience.
Swannack doesn't draw the comparison with Viet Nam, of course. But everyone else does. Panama was Viet Nam. Bosnia was Viet Nam. Haiti was Viet Nam. Afghanistan was Viet Nam. How many conflicts have to be Viet Nam before we finally figure out that the only country that is Viet Nam is a country in southeast Asia called Viet Nam?
All conflicts proceed according to their own logic, and not according to Viet Nam's.
As for the assessment that we may be losing strategically, I think we run into a definitional problem. Here's the paradox: Iraq can take turns for the worse at one level--the stiffening of resistance in Fallujah, or an uprising in the Shiite cities, for example--while the strategic situation in the middle east improves overall, even as a result of the invasion of Iraq, i.e., the decision of Muammar Khadafi to give up his WMDs and push for limited reforms in his government, or the reduced dependency of the United States on the good graces of the fickle and untrustworthy Saudi Arabian regime.
And with every passing day, we get closer to elections in the Shiite areas, which may well embolden democratic reformers in Iran and hasten change there.
All that happens quite independently of what happens in Fallujah or Abu Ghraib. But antidemocratic elements understand that dominos can fall both ways, and they can be expected to increase their murderous methods as we move closer to a democratic Shia. And the better the elections look, the more desperately the terrorists will work to sabotage them.
So one could see a situation where real progress toward democracy will spark an increase in terrorism. So a successful pro-democratic policy can look like a failure when assessed in terms of counterterrorism. In the short run, in Iraq.
And if there is no prospect of progress towards democracy in Iraq, then terrorists can focus their efforts elsewhere. Terrorism in certain areas could decline as a result. And so a policy which maximizes the reduction of terrorism in the short run could also mean it's a failure when assessed in terms of installing democracy--or even a stable and benevent non-democratic society.
So things can look worse even as they're getting better. And they can look better even as the situation subtly deteriorates. It's counterinuitive. It's Carrolian.
But such is the game theory of warfare, where one side is constantly reacting and adjusting to the actions of another.
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