Sunday, April 04, 2004
Walk, Don't Run
Nice bit of reporting from the L.A. Times here.
Note that the reporters include direct quotations from 12 different sources, in Washington and Fallujah, and included some Iraqi voices as well as Americans.
That's a lot of hustle, and it pays off in a damn good article.
My own suspicion is that the counteroffensive against those responsible for this mob violence is already underway, in a very quiet fashion.
Fallujah's a big town, but it isn't that big. People who grew up in Ramadi all their lives, for example, knew who the other Ramadi people were--if not by name, at least by neighborhood or tribe.
And Iraq isn't Somalia. Iraq has a police force of its own which is perfectly able to make arrests--often all they need is a name.
Put the two together, and mix in a critical mass of sheikhs who have a lot to lose by falling out of the good graces of coalition forces, and I believe there is every reason to expect that many of those in the mob scene who were foolish enough to show their faces on camera will soon find themselves either dead, or sporting orange jumpsuits in Abu Gharaib prison.
It isn't neccessary for US forces to get involved in a provocative, high profile, large-unit movement-to-contact counterattack. Given that US forces were looking to largely pull out of volatile areas like Ramadi and Fallujah anyway, as recently as last December, we may not see one at all. Especially if the intelligence side of the battle goes well.
Instead, we may see something like the following:
1.) No matter how bad anti-American sentiment is in Fallujah, there are still going to be a certain number of Fallujans who for whatever reasons are perfectly willing--even eager--to provide intelligence to coalition forces. Local commanders and intelligence officers, down to the company command level, will sit down with our reliable sources and say "roll tape."
2.) Once the tape is rolling, we'll just take careful notes while the source looks at the video and says "oh, I know that guy--he runs a vegetable stand on Highway 10...And that's Mohammad's brother Khamal. I don't know exactly where he lives, but he lives in Sheik Thamir's neighborhood. Thamir will be able to tell you. Hey, doesn't Thamir have a contracting business?"
3.) Commanders at all levels should carefully compare notes at this point. We routinely assess the reliability of sources in the past, and that reliability is passed on with every intelligence report. Crosscheck the results of each interview. It's not unusual for a source from one tribe to falsely implicate a neighboring tribe--or a neighbor--simply to settle an old grudge over who ran over so and so's sheep back during the British Occupation, or something. Look especially for any information about anyone on the tape corroborated by two or more sources.
4.) Have the mayor of the town present the sheikhs to the Americans, one by one, for interviews. Sheikhs are often scumbags. But they are usually very pragmatic scumbags. That's how they got to be Sheikhs. The conversation may go something like this:
American commander: Thank you very much for coming to see us. We apologize for the early, 10 AM appointment. We appreciate you having shown so promptly at 1:30 PM. We would like to discuss the recent unpleasantness in your neighborhood. We know we can count on your cooperation. You have always been a good friend. When that business is done, we would also like to discuss a future contract building 20 permanent structures for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps troops. We believe your firm might be a good match, and it could provide many jobs for your people. Would you care for some tea/Pepsi/single malt scotch?
Sheikh: I appreciate your interest, and I look forward to working with you. Please be assured I will do everything in my power to assfu--, er--assist you in your mission. I have no other motive but the lining of my purse--er, I mean, the prosperity and security of the people of Fallujah.
American commander: We appreciate your support. Moreover, we have every confidence in your leadership and integrity, and we know you are strong enough and honorable enough to assume full responsibility for everything that happens in your neighborhood. Of course, we will hold you personally responsible for any problems with your tribe. But this is because we respect your wisdom and the prestige you clearly have among the people of Fallujah.
Sheikh: I am a river to my people.
American Commander: Please make yourself comfortable. I am going to show you a series of videotapes--roll the tape please. We have already identified which individuals belong to you, personally, Sheikh. Of course, we would like to give you the opportunity to participate in our rewards program, by simply confirming each person's name and place of residence with us. Naturally, we have a list. By the way, thank you for the excellent work you did rebuilding the septic system underneath the local school. I look forward to many mutually beneficial projects in the future.
Now, can you please confirm the name and place of residence of this person shown in this video?
..And so it goes. Interview after meticulous interview. Raid packets are prepared on each house. Aerial photographs are enlarged to show each house and the surrounding houses from above to each commander. Grid coordinates are provided. Our Iraqi friends begin to reconnoiter the homes, again to confirm or deny the existence of each person there, or at least someone matching the description.
The American commanders summon the chief of police if Ramadi, hand him the list, and say "Bring us these people. By noon on friday. Or you're fired and we'll find another police chief who can actually do his job. By the way, tell your brother we'd like to see him about another oh-so-lucrative gravel pouring contract, which will provide jobs for many members of your family.
And so it goes. The Iraqi police go out, and pick up person after person, in the dead of night. They simply disappear. No, they aren't killed. They just wind up in the back of a truck with a hood over their heads and a tag on their collars. And then they, too, are interviewed. They, too, get to watch the tape. They, too, are quizzed about who they were with--who's that guy next to him--where does he live? What tribe? Where does he work.
And there's a second series of raids, which may involve coalition forces, or it may not.
The bottom line is, all this can be accomplished without a single tank column marching provocatively down Highway 10 and the middle of Ramadi. No muss, no fuss, no gory mess.
The longer it takes for the Marines to reoccupy Fallujah in force, the better and more smoothly I would suspect the USMC--Iraqi police cooperation is, and the better the intelligence picture is developing.
In an urban counterinsurgency, patience is a virtue, and careful meticulousness is often to be prized above bravado.
There's a story I got from the movie "Colors" about two bulls standing on a hill, looking at a herd of cows. The young bull says to the old bull, "Hey, gramps...whaddaya say we run down the hill and f#@k one of those cows?"
And the old bull says to the younger bull, "No, son. I've got a better idea. Let's walk down, and f#^k them all.
It's not always possible to walk down, rather than run. But if we are able to walk down the hill and f#@k all of those cows, we may never really know what happened. Some sleazeballs will disappear off the streets of Fallujah and nothing more will be said.
Minor quibble: Why spell it "Fallouja" instead of "Fallujah," like the rest of the English language media, guys? It doesn't get you any legitimacy points. All it does is make sure that your article--and all your hard work--is excluded on all Nexis-Lexis, Factiva, Dow Jones Interactive, and Google searches.
Splash, out
Jason
Correction: An alert reader reminds me that the movie I mentioned was "Colors." Not "Cops." I regret the error.
Note that the reporters include direct quotations from 12 different sources, in Washington and Fallujah, and included some Iraqi voices as well as Americans.
That's a lot of hustle, and it pays off in a damn good article.
My own suspicion is that the counteroffensive against those responsible for this mob violence is already underway, in a very quiet fashion.
Fallujah's a big town, but it isn't that big. People who grew up in Ramadi all their lives, for example, knew who the other Ramadi people were--if not by name, at least by neighborhood or tribe.
And Iraq isn't Somalia. Iraq has a police force of its own which is perfectly able to make arrests--often all they need is a name.
Put the two together, and mix in a critical mass of sheikhs who have a lot to lose by falling out of the good graces of coalition forces, and I believe there is every reason to expect that many of those in the mob scene who were foolish enough to show their faces on camera will soon find themselves either dead, or sporting orange jumpsuits in Abu Gharaib prison.
It isn't neccessary for US forces to get involved in a provocative, high profile, large-unit movement-to-contact counterattack. Given that US forces were looking to largely pull out of volatile areas like Ramadi and Fallujah anyway, as recently as last December, we may not see one at all. Especially if the intelligence side of the battle goes well.
Instead, we may see something like the following:
1.) No matter how bad anti-American sentiment is in Fallujah, there are still going to be a certain number of Fallujans who for whatever reasons are perfectly willing--even eager--to provide intelligence to coalition forces. Local commanders and intelligence officers, down to the company command level, will sit down with our reliable sources and say "roll tape."
2.) Once the tape is rolling, we'll just take careful notes while the source looks at the video and says "oh, I know that guy--he runs a vegetable stand on Highway 10...And that's Mohammad's brother Khamal. I don't know exactly where he lives, but he lives in Sheik Thamir's neighborhood. Thamir will be able to tell you. Hey, doesn't Thamir have a contracting business?"
3.) Commanders at all levels should carefully compare notes at this point. We routinely assess the reliability of sources in the past, and that reliability is passed on with every intelligence report. Crosscheck the results of each interview. It's not unusual for a source from one tribe to falsely implicate a neighboring tribe--or a neighbor--simply to settle an old grudge over who ran over so and so's sheep back during the British Occupation, or something. Look especially for any information about anyone on the tape corroborated by two or more sources.
4.) Have the mayor of the town present the sheikhs to the Americans, one by one, for interviews. Sheikhs are often scumbags. But they are usually very pragmatic scumbags. That's how they got to be Sheikhs. The conversation may go something like this:
American commander: Thank you very much for coming to see us. We apologize for the early, 10 AM appointment. We appreciate you having shown so promptly at 1:30 PM. We would like to discuss the recent unpleasantness in your neighborhood. We know we can count on your cooperation. You have always been a good friend. When that business is done, we would also like to discuss a future contract building 20 permanent structures for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps troops. We believe your firm might be a good match, and it could provide many jobs for your people. Would you care for some tea/Pepsi/single malt scotch?
Sheikh: I appreciate your interest, and I look forward to working with you. Please be assured I will do everything in my power to assfu--, er--assist you in your mission. I have no other motive but the lining of my purse--er, I mean, the prosperity and security of the people of Fallujah.
American commander: We appreciate your support. Moreover, we have every confidence in your leadership and integrity, and we know you are strong enough and honorable enough to assume full responsibility for everything that happens in your neighborhood. Of course, we will hold you personally responsible for any problems with your tribe. But this is because we respect your wisdom and the prestige you clearly have among the people of Fallujah.
Sheikh: I am a river to my people.
American Commander: Please make yourself comfortable. I am going to show you a series of videotapes--roll the tape please. We have already identified which individuals belong to you, personally, Sheikh. Of course, we would like to give you the opportunity to participate in our rewards program, by simply confirming each person's name and place of residence with us. Naturally, we have a list. By the way, thank you for the excellent work you did rebuilding the septic system underneath the local school. I look forward to many mutually beneficial projects in the future.
Now, can you please confirm the name and place of residence of this person shown in this video?
..And so it goes. Interview after meticulous interview. Raid packets are prepared on each house. Aerial photographs are enlarged to show each house and the surrounding houses from above to each commander. Grid coordinates are provided. Our Iraqi friends begin to reconnoiter the homes, again to confirm or deny the existence of each person there, or at least someone matching the description.
The American commanders summon the chief of police if Ramadi, hand him the list, and say "Bring us these people. By noon on friday. Or you're fired and we'll find another police chief who can actually do his job. By the way, tell your brother we'd like to see him about another oh-so-lucrative gravel pouring contract, which will provide jobs for many members of your family.
And so it goes. The Iraqi police go out, and pick up person after person, in the dead of night. They simply disappear. No, they aren't killed. They just wind up in the back of a truck with a hood over their heads and a tag on their collars. And then they, too, are interviewed. They, too, get to watch the tape. They, too, are quizzed about who they were with--who's that guy next to him--where does he live? What tribe? Where does he work.
And there's a second series of raids, which may involve coalition forces, or it may not.
The bottom line is, all this can be accomplished without a single tank column marching provocatively down Highway 10 and the middle of Ramadi. No muss, no fuss, no gory mess.
The longer it takes for the Marines to reoccupy Fallujah in force, the better and more smoothly I would suspect the USMC--Iraqi police cooperation is, and the better the intelligence picture is developing.
In an urban counterinsurgency, patience is a virtue, and careful meticulousness is often to be prized above bravado.
There's a story I got from the movie "Colors" about two bulls standing on a hill, looking at a herd of cows. The young bull says to the old bull, "Hey, gramps...whaddaya say we run down the hill and f#@k one of those cows?"
And the old bull says to the younger bull, "No, son. I've got a better idea. Let's walk down, and f#^k them all.
It's not always possible to walk down, rather than run. But if we are able to walk down the hill and f#@k all of those cows, we may never really know what happened. Some sleazeballs will disappear off the streets of Fallujah and nothing more will be said.
Minor quibble: Why spell it "Fallouja" instead of "Fallujah," like the rest of the English language media, guys? It doesn't get you any legitimacy points. All it does is make sure that your article--and all your hard work--is excluded on all Nexis-Lexis, Factiva, Dow Jones Interactive, and Google searches.
Splash, out
Jason
Correction: An alert reader reminds me that the movie I mentioned was "Colors." Not "Cops." I regret the error.
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