Tuesday, April 13, 2004
Reserve Retention: Houston, We Still Have a Problem
Military.com notes that recruiting and retention rates are for some National Guard units are way off last year's levels.
Things have improved markedly for Guardsmen and reservists since last summer--when a glance at the letters page of any Southwest Asia edition of the Stars and Stripes would have led one to wonder if active component and reserve component troops were going to give up the fight against the Fedayeen and turn against one another.
Intercomponent resentment was fierce, and morale was markedly lower among reserve and guard units than it was among active duty units. The lengthy deployment was only a part of the problem--we were also hurt by condescension from active duty soldiers, and a separate-but-equal pay and promotion system that wasn't so equal after all. (I.e., nearly 100% of national guardsmen experienced a significant pay problem while on active duty.)
For months, Pentagon officials have been denying there was a problem with Guard and reserve morale. They said it hadn't shown up in retention figures yet, and so it was too early to tell.
Out in Iraq, at the 'boots-on-the-ground' level, we knew better. "Of course it hasn't shown up in retention figures. We can't quit yet!" the troops would shout at the newspaper.
If there is a silver lining to this dark cloud, it's that as the exodus of experienced troops begins, it's going to become harder and harder for Pentagon officials to stick their head in the sand about Guard and reserve affairs.
Yes, we have taken some important steps. Allowing states to promote deployed officers against vacancies at home** was welcome step forward.
But it doesn't help to have Pentagon guys like Charles Abell, principal deputy under the Secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, come on the record and say that my soldiers who complain about the broken reserve component personnel system are being 'disengenuous.'
I'm sorry, Chuck. When I went into the Guard, nobody told me or any of my troopers that they would go from March to August in the zone before we collected the same hostile fire pay the active troops were getting without a problem--and even then you had the embarrassing spectacle of a batallion S-1 writing congress and the governor on behalf of his men to get the military pay system to fix the problem.
I don't remember anybody telling us "oh, by the way--those allotments through which you make sure your wife or dependents can have money to subsist on while you're away--those are for active duty troops. That's not for you."
Nobody explained to my troops that they're the only idiots in the DoD who, after serving 20 years, have to wait until age 60 to collect retirement benefits (Federal employees can collect at age 55, while active duty retirees can collect immediately upon retiring--for some as young as 37.)
Everybody knew we could get called up at any time, of course. But nobody knew our entire promotion system would nearly freeze for the entirety of that year. Nor did anybody explain to us that if we were mobilized as guardsmen, our NCOs and officers were not eligible to attend the same career schools that the active duty troops were going to all summer (although the Army did, eventually put a stop to anybody leaving Iraq to attend a service school.)
Nobody briefed us to say "hey, since you're reserve component, we can't enroll you directly in the Thrift Savings Program since you're on a different pay system."
I don't think the Army deceived us. Not in the slightest. Really, it had been so long since a massive deployment of reserve component soldiers for more than a year at a time, that we just hadn't thought through these issues.
Hey, lessons learned. We're all professionals.
But the Pentagon's 'blame it on the soldier' attitude is, well, a little hard to take. Nobody's being anywhere near as disengenuous with the Pentagon as the Pentagon is being disengenuous with itself.
Splash, out
Jason
**(Since guard and reserve officers--unlike active duty officers--could not leave their units to accept slots that would lead to promotion, many reserve officers who were already selected for promotion were stuck, and forced to watch active duty officers who are years junior to them transfer to the slots and take the promotion. Allowing states to promote deployed guard officers against vacant slots in their home states ameliorated the problem somewhat--at least for guard officers. NCO promotions and USAR promotions remain problematic.)
Things have improved markedly for Guardsmen and reservists since last summer--when a glance at the letters page of any Southwest Asia edition of the Stars and Stripes would have led one to wonder if active component and reserve component troops were going to give up the fight against the Fedayeen and turn against one another.
Intercomponent resentment was fierce, and morale was markedly lower among reserve and guard units than it was among active duty units. The lengthy deployment was only a part of the problem--we were also hurt by condescension from active duty soldiers, and a separate-but-equal pay and promotion system that wasn't so equal after all. (I.e., nearly 100% of national guardsmen experienced a significant pay problem while on active duty.)
For months, Pentagon officials have been denying there was a problem with Guard and reserve morale. They said it hadn't shown up in retention figures yet, and so it was too early to tell.
Out in Iraq, at the 'boots-on-the-ground' level, we knew better. "Of course it hasn't shown up in retention figures. We can't quit yet!" the troops would shout at the newspaper.
If there is a silver lining to this dark cloud, it's that as the exodus of experienced troops begins, it's going to become harder and harder for Pentagon officials to stick their head in the sand about Guard and reserve affairs.
Yes, we have taken some important steps. Allowing states to promote deployed officers against vacancies at home** was welcome step forward.
But it doesn't help to have Pentagon guys like Charles Abell, principal deputy under the Secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, come on the record and say that my soldiers who complain about the broken reserve component personnel system are being 'disengenuous.'
I'm sorry, Chuck. When I went into the Guard, nobody told me or any of my troopers that they would go from March to August in the zone before we collected the same hostile fire pay the active troops were getting without a problem--and even then you had the embarrassing spectacle of a batallion S-1 writing congress and the governor on behalf of his men to get the military pay system to fix the problem.
I don't remember anybody telling us "oh, by the way--those allotments through which you make sure your wife or dependents can have money to subsist on while you're away--those are for active duty troops. That's not for you."
Nobody explained to my troops that they're the only idiots in the DoD who, after serving 20 years, have to wait until age 60 to collect retirement benefits (Federal employees can collect at age 55, while active duty retirees can collect immediately upon retiring--for some as young as 37.)
Everybody knew we could get called up at any time, of course. But nobody knew our entire promotion system would nearly freeze for the entirety of that year. Nor did anybody explain to us that if we were mobilized as guardsmen, our NCOs and officers were not eligible to attend the same career schools that the active duty troops were going to all summer (although the Army did, eventually put a stop to anybody leaving Iraq to attend a service school.)
Nobody briefed us to say "hey, since you're reserve component, we can't enroll you directly in the Thrift Savings Program since you're on a different pay system."
I don't think the Army deceived us. Not in the slightest. Really, it had been so long since a massive deployment of reserve component soldiers for more than a year at a time, that we just hadn't thought through these issues.
Hey, lessons learned. We're all professionals.
But the Pentagon's 'blame it on the soldier' attitude is, well, a little hard to take. Nobody's being anywhere near as disengenuous with the Pentagon as the Pentagon is being disengenuous with itself.
Splash, out
Jason
**(Since guard and reserve officers--unlike active duty officers--could not leave their units to accept slots that would lead to promotion, many reserve officers who were already selected for promotion were stuck, and forced to watch active duty officers who are years junior to them transfer to the slots and take the promotion. Allowing states to promote deployed guard officers against vacant slots in their home states ameliorated the problem somewhat--at least for guard officers. NCO promotions and USAR promotions remain problematic.)
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