Saturday, April 10, 2004
Out on a Limb...Predictions 04
My best guess is that within about 4-6 weeks the Sadr brigade and Mahdi militias will have gone to ground once again, or be destroyed by American forces, at which time we will see a return to the baseline levels of violence and insurgent activities we have seen over most of the winter.
I hate to fall into the tired saw that "the only thing Iraqis understand is force." Iraqis aren't dogs. But they do understand force very well. And they will soon find out that amateur militias unsupported by regular troops don't last very long in the face of a determined onslaught by the opposing force's regulars.
The militiamen have taken control of several cities at the moment. They cannot hold them. If they try, they will be dispatched very handily. Which will cost the militia a lot of the short-term support they've built up--which is still a minority of the Shia community.
Sistani is still the stronger and wiser man. Iraqi's aren't totally clueless--they'll figure this out, soon. And they'll realize that Sadr brings nothing but suffering to his people.
Mostly, Iraqis don't want to kill or be killed. They want to keep their heads down, rebuild their country, send their children to school, and get on with their lives. More than anything, they want security. So far, Coalition forces and our allies in the Iraqi Police have been hard-pressed to provide it. But Al Sadr will be further discredited when it becomes apparent to the Iraqis that he can provide even less.
Insurgency will come in and out of fashion. But Iraqis will soon tire of the idiots in their midst causing trouble and attracting disruptive coalition troops. And when their towns are retaken, there will be many willing sources eager to finger the militia ringleaders.
That said, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of executing a meaningful transfer of sovereignty to Iraqi authorities on schedule, as promised. Whether the governing council is ready for it or not.
No more Balfours. If the West keeps only one promise to indigenous people this century, this one ought to be it.
If it happens, and happens in a public way that Iraqis can understand, then much of the wind will be taken out of Sadr's sails. Sistani will reassert control of the Shia in his masterful way (he's the smartest guy in country by far), and we will begin moving towards elections.
At this point Al Qaeda will make a concerted effort once again to disrupt political elections with mass casualty-producing attacks designed to turn Shia and Sunni Moslems against one another, as we saw last spring. They will also target coalition nations as each nation approaches elections, in an effort to embarrass hawks in each country and get doves elected to office--a strategy used to tremendous effect in Spain last month. Countries percieved as weak will get extra attention from Al Qaeda, for the same reason battleground states get a lot of attention from Presidential campaigns. It's a matter of return on the investment of limited resources. (More on this in a later post).
If, on the other hand, we reneg on the sovereignty promise, we will only strengthen the hand of the insurgent, as all the worst suspicions about the occupying forces and our government's motives will have been, in Iraqis' eyes, confirmed.
And then the scenario is much bleaker.
Splash, out
Jason
P.S., Intel Dump has a more pessimistic outlook. Scroll down a bit.
I hate to fall into the tired saw that "the only thing Iraqis understand is force." Iraqis aren't dogs. But they do understand force very well. And they will soon find out that amateur militias unsupported by regular troops don't last very long in the face of a determined onslaught by the opposing force's regulars.
The militiamen have taken control of several cities at the moment. They cannot hold them. If they try, they will be dispatched very handily. Which will cost the militia a lot of the short-term support they've built up--which is still a minority of the Shia community.
Sistani is still the stronger and wiser man. Iraqi's aren't totally clueless--they'll figure this out, soon. And they'll realize that Sadr brings nothing but suffering to his people.
Mostly, Iraqis don't want to kill or be killed. They want to keep their heads down, rebuild their country, send their children to school, and get on with their lives. More than anything, they want security. So far, Coalition forces and our allies in the Iraqi Police have been hard-pressed to provide it. But Al Sadr will be further discredited when it becomes apparent to the Iraqis that he can provide even less.
Insurgency will come in and out of fashion. But Iraqis will soon tire of the idiots in their midst causing trouble and attracting disruptive coalition troops. And when their towns are retaken, there will be many willing sources eager to finger the militia ringleaders.
That said, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of executing a meaningful transfer of sovereignty to Iraqi authorities on schedule, as promised. Whether the governing council is ready for it or not.
No more Balfours. If the West keeps only one promise to indigenous people this century, this one ought to be it.
If it happens, and happens in a public way that Iraqis can understand, then much of the wind will be taken out of Sadr's sails. Sistani will reassert control of the Shia in his masterful way (he's the smartest guy in country by far), and we will begin moving towards elections.
At this point Al Qaeda will make a concerted effort once again to disrupt political elections with mass casualty-producing attacks designed to turn Shia and Sunni Moslems against one another, as we saw last spring. They will also target coalition nations as each nation approaches elections, in an effort to embarrass hawks in each country and get doves elected to office--a strategy used to tremendous effect in Spain last month. Countries percieved as weak will get extra attention from Al Qaeda, for the same reason battleground states get a lot of attention from Presidential campaigns. It's a matter of return on the investment of limited resources. (More on this in a later post).
If, on the other hand, we reneg on the sovereignty promise, we will only strengthen the hand of the insurgent, as all the worst suspicions about the occupying forces and our government's motives will have been, in Iraqis' eyes, confirmed.
And then the scenario is much bleaker.
Splash, out
Jason
P.S., Intel Dump has a more pessimistic outlook. Scroll down a bit.
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