Wednesday, April 28, 2004
Nonlinear Battlefields, Nonlinear Thinking.
This is what happens when an officer spends too much time in rich units.
"They were not intended to be on the front lines," [1st Armored Division Major General Martin] Dempsey said of the unarmored vehicles. "In a linear battlefield, Humvees always operated behind the front lines - in most cases even out of artillery range. Iraq isn't a linear battlefield. As we find ourselves in a low- to mid-intensity conflict, and we have all these vehicles designed for a linear battlefield, they come up short."
Well, that's just not true.
First of all, every airborne or air assault infantry battalion in the Army has a Delta company, which at full strength comprises five antitank platoons of four TOW vehicles and two command Humvees each. The other light infantry battalions may just have a section. But in any case, they are NOT equipped with the uparmored models, the M1045 or similar variants.
Further, these anti-tank units are routinely assigned to "conduct a screen," or perform a security, early warning, and counterreconnaisance mission forward of friendly units in the defense, and forward or to the flanks in the offense. This is what they expect to do on a linear battlefield with relatively secure rear areas (is there such a thing? Has there EVER been such a thing in the history of modern mechanized warfare?)
(Yeah, some Fort Benning/Leavenworth types can quibble with my terminology and MTOE terms. But I'm trying to keep the jargon to a minimum for a nonmilitary audience. So Nmnyah!)
When rear areas are not secure, though, the emphasis for these companies and platoons will often switch to an emphasis on convoy security. Indeed, in training environments, one or more of these platoons are detailed to escorting battalion logistics convoys, or in some circumstances, escorting the Battalion command element.
Further, the uparmored Humvee is far from ubiquitous even in Armored units. For example, prior to my coming to Florida in 2000, I had the pleasure of serving as a tank platoon leader and executive officer in the 2nd Battalion, 123rd Armor. (And it was a pleasure, guys! You guys were great!).
Now, every tank battalion also has a reconnaisance platoon. And our reconnaisance platoon was equipped with--you got it--the M966s. Not the uparmored variety.
Now, General Dempsey isn't going to be able to convince me that a reconnaisance/scout platoon is supposed to operate in a secure, rear area. Because I've been an anti-armor platoon leader and a scout platoon leader once upon a time. And an HHC commander with a scout platoon under me. And I happen to have read the ARTEP and field manuals for both kinds of units cover to cover.
(Not that I'm God's gift to the Army or anything. I'm not. But it seemed like the thing to do at the time.)
Nevertheless, General Dempsey seems to be arguing that on a linear battlefield, scouts function like MPs--providing security to rear areas. And anti-armor platoons don't mass fires forward or screen, but are really just a kind of heavily armed tugboat for Battalion logistical convoys.
The argument runs counter to decades of doctrinal development at Knox, Benning, Leavenworth, NTC, and JRTC. And I've got the manuals to prove it.
But it gets even stranger.
By claiming that the arrangement of Humvees within maneuver units was really designed for a linear battlefield, he raises the obvious question: didn't anybody plan for a nonlinear battlefield? I mean, isn't it part and parcel of maneuver warfar theory to mass your maneuver elements to achieve a decisive breakthrough, bypass strongpoints, and concentrate overwhelming firepower on critical vulnerabilities in the enemy's rear?
And when you supply units which have bypassed other enemy and gone for the Hail Mary, aren't those logistical elements themselves operating in a nonlinear battlefield?
In short, isn't it the goal of the maneuver theory junkies and AirLand battle fetishists to permanently and decisively un-linearize the battlefield?
I mean, we did project eventually taking Baghdad, right? At which time the mission could have reasonably been expected to center on garrison duty, civil affairs, and security missions within the cities themselves, with the garrisons connected to the logistics system through the existing network of highways, themselves running through other cities. Right? I mean, what other form could the occupation have taken?
And we didn't expect insurgents to target our supply lines? We thought Al Qaeda and the other whackos would just roll over? Was the whole 'flypaper strategy' a hoax?
If true, this is a rosy scenario that makes the Reagan Administration's first budget look like it was written by a bipolar Eeyore in a depressive phase.
Anyway you slice it, we screwed up. Either we did not expect the Iraq conflict to be nonlinear (which is hard to believe), or we did not adjust our tables of organization and equipment to reflect the nature of low to mid-intensity urban guerrilla warfare.
This strikes me as far and away the most likely view. At my very lowly, catfish, bottom-dwelling scumsucking level, that was exactly the case.
As an HHC commander or executive officer, I could not request equipment I didn't even know existed.
And I didn't know the high-tech protective vests existed until I saw some Air Force forward observers show up with them (hey, where'd you get those from?), and I didn't know the uparmored Hummers existed in any quantities until I got to Iraq. And I didn't know the Blue Force Tracker satellite system existed until I asked the 3rd ACR for a commo plan for my convoys and they said "oh, we just use the BlueFor. We can see your location on this computer!
Ummm...we're Guard. We don't have, you know, budgets. We don't have BlueFor. What's BlueFor?
If I had known they existed in January-March 2003, I would have requested all of them before the fight even started.
Battalion, Brigade, Division, and Corps staffs are simply not all-seeing. They're made up of hardworking but imperfect people living in families of varying functionality all over the military who are working their nuts off and doing the best they know how.
A healthy environment for brainstorming and a respect for the experiences of all kinds of soldiers of all ranks can go a long way towards helping commands anticipate equipment and logistics problems.
But sometimes things only become apparent in hindsight. And sometimes you've got to see a piece of equipment in action before it can occur to you you can request it.
But no matter how you slice it, General Dempsey's linear battlefield explaination just doesn't hold water.
Splash, out
Jason
"They were not intended to be on the front lines," [1st Armored Division Major General Martin] Dempsey said of the unarmored vehicles. "In a linear battlefield, Humvees always operated behind the front lines - in most cases even out of artillery range. Iraq isn't a linear battlefield. As we find ourselves in a low- to mid-intensity conflict, and we have all these vehicles designed for a linear battlefield, they come up short."
Well, that's just not true.
First of all, every airborne or air assault infantry battalion in the Army has a Delta company, which at full strength comprises five antitank platoons of four TOW vehicles and two command Humvees each. The other light infantry battalions may just have a section. But in any case, they are NOT equipped with the uparmored models, the M1045 or similar variants.
Further, these anti-tank units are routinely assigned to "conduct a screen," or perform a security, early warning, and counterreconnaisance mission forward of friendly units in the defense, and forward or to the flanks in the offense. This is what they expect to do on a linear battlefield with relatively secure rear areas (is there such a thing? Has there EVER been such a thing in the history of modern mechanized warfare?)
(Yeah, some Fort Benning/Leavenworth types can quibble with my terminology and MTOE terms. But I'm trying to keep the jargon to a minimum for a nonmilitary audience. So Nmnyah!)
When rear areas are not secure, though, the emphasis for these companies and platoons will often switch to an emphasis on convoy security. Indeed, in training environments, one or more of these platoons are detailed to escorting battalion logistics convoys, or in some circumstances, escorting the Battalion command element.
Further, the uparmored Humvee is far from ubiquitous even in Armored units. For example, prior to my coming to Florida in 2000, I had the pleasure of serving as a tank platoon leader and executive officer in the 2nd Battalion, 123rd Armor. (And it was a pleasure, guys! You guys were great!).
Now, every tank battalion also has a reconnaisance platoon. And our reconnaisance platoon was equipped with--you got it--the M966s. Not the uparmored variety.
Now, General Dempsey isn't going to be able to convince me that a reconnaisance/scout platoon is supposed to operate in a secure, rear area. Because I've been an anti-armor platoon leader and a scout platoon leader once upon a time. And an HHC commander with a scout platoon under me. And I happen to have read the ARTEP and field manuals for both kinds of units cover to cover.
(Not that I'm God's gift to the Army or anything. I'm not. But it seemed like the thing to do at the time.)
Nevertheless, General Dempsey seems to be arguing that on a linear battlefield, scouts function like MPs--providing security to rear areas. And anti-armor platoons don't mass fires forward or screen, but are really just a kind of heavily armed tugboat for Battalion logistical convoys.
The argument runs counter to decades of doctrinal development at Knox, Benning, Leavenworth, NTC, and JRTC. And I've got the manuals to prove it.
But it gets even stranger.
By claiming that the arrangement of Humvees within maneuver units was really designed for a linear battlefield, he raises the obvious question: didn't anybody plan for a nonlinear battlefield? I mean, isn't it part and parcel of maneuver warfar theory to mass your maneuver elements to achieve a decisive breakthrough, bypass strongpoints, and concentrate overwhelming firepower on critical vulnerabilities in the enemy's rear?
And when you supply units which have bypassed other enemy and gone for the Hail Mary, aren't those logistical elements themselves operating in a nonlinear battlefield?
In short, isn't it the goal of the maneuver theory junkies and AirLand battle fetishists to permanently and decisively un-linearize the battlefield?
I mean, we did project eventually taking Baghdad, right? At which time the mission could have reasonably been expected to center on garrison duty, civil affairs, and security missions within the cities themselves, with the garrisons connected to the logistics system through the existing network of highways, themselves running through other cities. Right? I mean, what other form could the occupation have taken?
And we didn't expect insurgents to target our supply lines? We thought Al Qaeda and the other whackos would just roll over? Was the whole 'flypaper strategy' a hoax?
If true, this is a rosy scenario that makes the Reagan Administration's first budget look like it was written by a bipolar Eeyore in a depressive phase.
Anyway you slice it, we screwed up. Either we did not expect the Iraq conflict to be nonlinear (which is hard to believe), or we did not adjust our tables of organization and equipment to reflect the nature of low to mid-intensity urban guerrilla warfare.
This strikes me as far and away the most likely view. At my very lowly, catfish, bottom-dwelling scumsucking level, that was exactly the case.
As an HHC commander or executive officer, I could not request equipment I didn't even know existed.
And I didn't know the high-tech protective vests existed until I saw some Air Force forward observers show up with them (hey, where'd you get those from?), and I didn't know the uparmored Hummers existed in any quantities until I got to Iraq. And I didn't know the Blue Force Tracker satellite system existed until I asked the 3rd ACR for a commo plan for my convoys and they said "oh, we just use the BlueFor. We can see your location on this computer!
Ummm...we're Guard. We don't have, you know, budgets. We don't have BlueFor. What's BlueFor?
If I had known they existed in January-March 2003, I would have requested all of them before the fight even started.
Battalion, Brigade, Division, and Corps staffs are simply not all-seeing. They're made up of hardworking but imperfect people living in families of varying functionality all over the military who are working their nuts off and doing the best they know how.
A healthy environment for brainstorming and a respect for the experiences of all kinds of soldiers of all ranks can go a long way towards helping commands anticipate equipment and logistics problems.
But sometimes things only become apparent in hindsight. And sometimes you've got to see a piece of equipment in action before it can occur to you you can request it.
But no matter how you slice it, General Dempsey's linear battlefield explaination just doesn't hold water.
Splash, out
Jason
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